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Simple interest rate rules, often termed Taylor rules, have been used frequently to 
describe the implementation of monetary policy in closed economies. Before the onset of the 
Global Financial Crisis, central banks were typically viewed as responding to inflationary 
pressure and an overheating economy. The vagaries of financial markets since the crisis have, 
however, heightened the concern for financial stability. Greater awareness of the dangers of 
distorted asset prices and financial imbalances has produced more recent specifications of 
Taylor-type rules that include asset prices, interest rate spreads or credit aggregates.1 
 A discussion of Taylor-type rules for small open economies in the current environment 
raises the question of whether monetary policy should respond to the (real or nominal) exchange 
rate. In the past, the case for including an exchange rate argument in simple interest rate rules for 
monetary policy has been weak. With the exception of economies characterized by financial 
fragility or dominated by the foreign sector , most of the literature supported the view of Taylor 
(2001, p.266) and Taylor and Williams (2011) that either there are small performance 
improvements from reacting to the exchange rate or that such reactions can make performance 
worse.2 Two sets of developments suggest the need to revisit this issue. 
The first is the emergence of a new generation of open-economy macroeconomic models 
in which the real exchange rate plays a more fundamental role. The earlier generation of models, 
for example, the models in Gali and Monacelli (2005) and Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2001, 2002) 
had the implication that optimal monetary policy in the open economy was isomorphic to policy 
in the closed economy. This suggested that  the Taylor rule for an open economy might not need 
to be extended beyond domestic inflation and the output gap. 
 The isomorphism is a distinctive feature of models where the Phillips curve has no direct 
real exchange rate channel. The real exchange rate affects domestic inflation only indirectly 
                                                          
1 In fact, an extensive debate about the response of monetary policy to developments in asset markets began at 
the turn of the millennium. Cecchetti et al. (2000, 2002) were in favor of rules that respond to financial asset prices 
while Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001) were opposed. For a recent overview of the debate see Kaefer (2014). 
More generally on the issue of reconciling financial stability with other macroeconomic goals, see Leeper and 
Nason (2015), Vredin (2015), Smets (2014), and Woodford (2012). 
2 Empirical evidence cited by Taylor and Williams (2011) came from 1990s open economy econometric models. 
Their view receives support from studies within New Keynesian models. Examples are Batini et al. (2003 and 
Leitemo and Söderström (2005). Garcia et al. (2011) find that inclusion of the level of the real exchange rate in a 
Taylor-type rule increases the variability of inflation and the output gap. They do, however, find that smoothing 
the real exchange rate helps reduce financial volatility without adding to inflation or output variability. 
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through its effect on the output gap. A later generation of models extends the role of the real 
exchange rate. Imported inputs (Monacelli (2013)), incomplete exchange rate pass-through 
(Monacelli (2005)), and concern about foreign competitiveness as a factor in firm pricing 
(Froyen and Guender (2017)) all suggest direct exchange rate effects in the Phillips curve. In 
models with a  real exchange rate channel in the Phillips curve the importance of the real 
exchange rate in the optimal target rule for monetary policy depends on the underlying inflation 
objective.  
The recent literature also suggests that openness raises questions about the central bank’s 
inflation objective.  Allsopp, Kara and Nelson (2006) favor CPI inflation targeting. Kirsanova, 
Leith, and Wren-Lewis (2006) and others support the earlier studies cited above in advocating a 
domestic rather than a CPI inflation objective. Froyen and Guender (2017), following Ball 
(1999), consider a real-exchange-rate-adjusted (REX) inflation target similar to core inflation 
measures employed by some central banks. 
Recent papers such as Corsetti et al. (2011) and Monacelli (2013) probe the question of 
whether monetary policy in an open economy is fundamentally different from that of a closed 
economy; for a variety of reasons in the newer generation of open economy models the answer is 
yes.3 This suggests the need to re-examine open-economy Taylor rules.         
The second set of developments concern changes in global financial markets following 
the financial crisis of 2007-2009. The policies of the Federal Reserve and other major central 
banks, consisting of large asset purchases and near zero policy interest rates, led to massive 
flows of capital to smaller open economies. Countries as diverse as Turkey, Brazil, South Africa, 
Malaysia, Mexico and Indonesia saw a substantial portion of their local currency government 
bonds purchased by foreign investors.  In many of these countries the result was a sharp 
appreciation of their currency.   These open economies are now left vulnerable to sudden stops 
and falling currency values with capital flowing back to the United States as the Federal Reserve 
pursues “lift-off”, returning U.S. interest rates to more normal levels. Raghuram Rajan, the 
former Governor of the Indian central bank, complained about the increased market volatility 
                                                          
3 Corsetti et al. argue that monetary policy should stabilize the real exchange rate if import prices are sticky in the 
local currency. Monacelli advocates stabilizing the ratio of real marginal cost to the terms of trade friction.  
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caused by the sharp swings in capital flows.4 In 2016-17 concerns about possible devaluation of 
the Chinese yuan, Brexit, and then the prospect for a sharp rise in the U.S. dollar as a result of 
prospective Trump administration tax and trade policies led to further instability in global 
financial markets.  
Because of the increased turbulence in world financial markets, central banks in small 
open economies may find it necessary to add exchange rate stability to the list of policy goals. 
Support for this comes from inside international supervisory agencies. Olivier Blanchard et al. 
(2010, p. 210) argue that “[c]entral banks in small open economies should explicitly recognize 
that exchange rate stability is part of their objective function.” One would think that expanding 
policy goals beyond the dual mandate that underlies the standard Taylor rule suggests expanding 
the rule itself to include a real exchange rate objective.  
This paper evaluates Taylor-type rules in an open economy framework where the central 
bank views exchange rate stability as an added but secondary objective. We consider three 
potential  central bank inflation objectives: domestic, CPI, and real-exchange-rate adjusted 
(REX) inflation.  For each inflation measure we design a Taylor-type rule and compare its 
stabilizing properties to a benchmark where the central bank follows an optimal policy under 
Woodford’s (1999) timeless perspective defined for each of these inflation objectives.    
Our most important findings can be briefly summarized here. Even a small weight on real 
exchange rate stability is sufficient to affect materially the performance of Taylor-type rules 
relative to the benchmark optimal policy. Gains are substantial particularly for domestic and 
REX inflation targets because even a small weight on real exchange rate fluctuations in the loss 
function inhibits the aggressive use of the policy instrument under optimal policy. As real 
exchange rate stability is a built-in feature of a CPI inflation objective, the gains under a CPI 
inflation target are considerably lower. A central bank that values real exchange rate stability to a 
degree and follows a Taylor-type rule should respond to the real exchange rate. Doing so reduces 
                                                          
4 Concerns about the potential disruptive effect of a change in US monetary policy in the foreign exchange and 
international capital markets have been expressed by the World Bank (2015), the IMF (Lagarde (2015)), and 
individual BRICS countries. Not only emerging or developing countries are worried about exchange rate instability. 
Concerns about an unjustifiably high exchange rate and the consequences of a free fall of the exchange rate should 
the Federal Reserve tighten its policy stance were raised by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand in 2014.  During the 
Global Financial Crisis in 2009 the Swiss National Bank took steps to stabilize the Swiss Franc vis-à-vis the Euro in a 
deflationary environment. It did so again in the wake of the Sovereign Debt Crisis in 2011. 
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relative losses further irrespective of the specification of the inflation objective. Relative losses 
decrease still further if the central bank can optimize over the coefficients in the Taylor rule. 
Indeed, relative losses hover around the 10 percent mark for all three inflation objectives. Only a 
complete disregard for exchange rate stability as an ultimate policy goal bears out the 
conventional view that there is no substantive role for the real exchange rate in Taylor-type rules.   
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section introduces a New 
Keynesian model of a small open economy that serves as our frame of reference. This section 
also offers a brief analysis of flexible domestic, CPI, and REX inflation targeting under optimal 
policy from a timeless perspective. Section 3 compares the performance of various Taylor-type 
rules vis-à-vis optimal policy in two different scenarios, one where the central bank values 
exchange rate stability and the other where it does not. Section 4 discusses optimized Taylor 
rules and how they compare to optimal policy. A conclusion is offered in Section 5.      
2. INFLATION OBJECTIVES IN A SMALL OPEN ECONOMY 
 The focus of this paper is a comparison of the performance of simple Taylor rules with 
optimal policy within a given flexible inflation targeting framework. The flexible inflation 
targeting frameworks considered include the output gap and inflation objectives actually in use 
in small open economies. These are expanded to include an exchange rate stability objective. 
This section lays out a stylized model of a small open economy which serves as a point of 
reference for our evaluation of Taylor rules in Section 3. This stylized model is based on 
uncovered interest rate parity holding in the asset market and perfect exchange rate pass-
through.6 
 
A. A Small Open Economy Model 
 The model consists of four equations which are briefly described below.7 
  t t t 1 t t t 1 t t 1 t tπ βE π κy b(q q ) βb(E q q ) u                 (1)
CPI f f
t t t 1 1 t t t 1 2 t t t 1 3 t t t 1 ty E y a (R E π ) a (q E q ) a ( y E y ) v              (2) 
                                                          
6 Perfect exchange rate pass-through and uncovered interest rate parity can be thought of as a representative 
baseline case. An analysis of the sensitivity of the reported results to both conventions is left for future work.  
7 The derivation of the Phillips curve is explained in a separate appendix. The rest of the model is a standard New 





t t t 1 t t 1 t t 1 t tR E π R E π E q q ε               (3) 
 
CPI
t t tπ π γΔq       (4)
where     
t  the rate of domestic inflation  

CPI
1ttE   
the expected rate of CPI inflation 
tq  
the real exchange rate (an increase in 𝑞𝑡 implies a depreciation) 
ty =  the output gap 
tR  the nominal rate of interest (policy instrument) 
ftR  
the foreign nominal rate of interest 

f
1ttE   the expected foreign rate of inflation 
f
ty =  the foreign output gap 
Lower case variables represent logarithms. All parameters are positive. The discount factor   is 
less than or equal to one. 
 Equation (1) is an open-economy Phillips curve that features a real exchange rate 
channel in addition to the standard output gap channel. Equation (2) is an open-economy IS 
relation with a real interest rate and a real exchange rate channel. A foreign output shock and an 
idiosyncratic domestic shock also affect the demand for domestic output. Equation (3) is the 
linearized uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) condition: apart from a stochastic risk premium 
( 𝑡) agents are assumed to trade in a frictionless international bond market. More formally, the 
stochastic disturbances are modeled as follows: 8 
𝑢𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑢
2)  𝑣𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣














2 )   
All foreign variables are exogenous independent random variables. Finally, equation (4) 
describes the relationship between the CPI inflation rate, the domestic inflation rate, the real 
exchange rate, and consumption openness (γ) under perfect exchange rate pass-through. 
                                                          
8 The property that all shocks are white noise follows Woodford (1999). Its purpose is to show that gradual 
adjustment of the output gap, the rate of inflation, etc. and the policy instrument under policy from a timeless 
perspective is not exclusively tied to the presence of autocorrelated disturbances in the model. 
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B. The Choice of a Flexible Inflation Target by an Optimizing Central Bank 
 In the following subsections we consider three  flexible inflation targeting regimes. Each 
regime is associated with a particular definition of inflation: domestic inflation, exchange-rate 
adjusted inflation or CPI inflation.   
 A flexible inflation targeting regime is one where the central bank is concerned about 
variables other than just the rate of inflation. An optimizing central bank practicing flexible 
inflation targeting minimizes its objective function subject to the constraint imposed by the 
model economy. Woodford’s (1999) policy from a timeless perspective is the form of 
commitment the central bank adheres to. 
  In the academic literature a central bank engaging in flexible inflation targeting is 
typically modelled as having a dual mandate. The objective function consists of the squared 
deviations of the output gap and the particular rate of inflation the central bank targets.9 As 
mentioned previously, however, recent experience and ongoing developments cast  doubt on 
whether this convention captures all objectives of a central bank in a small open economy. To 
articulate this point, we extend the central bank mandate to include stability of the real exchange 
rate.10    
 
 1. Targeting Domestic Inflation 
 In the first strategy we consider, the rate of inflation is defined in terms of changes in the 
level of domestic prices. The explicit objective function that the central bank attempts to 





2 ]∞𝑖=0     (5) 
 
                                                          
9 Examples are Taylor (2001), Aoki (2001) and Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2001). 
10 With either specification, our approach is to assume that the central bank decides on (or is assigned) a set of 
objectives. The alternative is a utility-based endogenous loss function. The latter approach has much to 
recommend it in optimal policy analysis though each approach has pitfalls (cf. Blanchard (2016), Sims (2012), 
Walsh (2005) and with specific reference to Taylor rules Woodford (2001))). The approach here, where a Taylor 
rule is compared with optimal policy within a given flexible inflation targeting framework, seems better suited to 
the evaluation of simple rules, the underlying rationale for which lies with traditional central bank objectives. It is 




 is the discount factor and   represents the relative weight the policymaker attaches to the 
squared deviations of the rate of domestic inflation from target. In a similar vein, 𝛿is the relative 
weight accorded to the squared realizations of the real exchange rate.11  
 To reduce the dimension of the central bank’s domestic inflation targeting strategy to one 
involving three choice variables, we need to take two additional steps. First, substitute for the 
rate of CPI inflation in equation (2). Second, substitute the UIP condition into the IS equation. 












s. t.  
𝜋𝑡 = 𝛽𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1 + 𝜅𝑦𝑡 + 𝑏(𝑞𝑡 − 𝑞𝑡−1) − 𝛽𝑏(𝐸𝑡𝑞𝑡+1 − 𝑞𝑡) + 𝑢𝑡 (6) 
and  









) + 𝑣𝑡 
 
Combining the first-order conditions yields the endogenous target rule. Under policy from a 
timeless perspective, the target rule is complex. The model is therefore solved numerically.  
 
2. Targeting CPI Inflation 
 If the focus of policy rests on CPI inflation, then the policymaker minimizes  
   
i 2 CPI 2 2
t t i t i t i
i 0





    (7) 
 
subject to the constraint which is represented by the model economy. After rewriting the 
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0  
s. t.           (8) 
                                                          




t t t 1 t t t 1 t t 1 tπ βE π κy (1 β)(γ b)q (γ b)q β(γ b)E q u              
and 
f f f f
t t t 1 1 t t t 1 t 1 2 t t 1 t 3 t t t 1 ty E y a (R E π ε ) (a (1 γ ) a )(E q q ) a ( y E y ) v               
 
As in the case of domestic inflation the target rule for CPI inflation under policy from a timeless 
perspective proves complex and is therefore not reported. The variances of the endogenous 
variables are again determined by numerical solution. 
 
3. Targeting “R(eal)-EX(change)-Rate-Adjusted” Inflation 
 This section introduces an alternative inflation target. This alternative target is domestic 
inflation stripped of the effects of changes in the real exchange rate. In small open economies 
central banks often target core or underlying inflation rather than headline inflation for the 
simple reason that headline inflation may be distorted due to severe temporary exchange rate 
movements.  A REX inflation target transforms an open-economy Phillips curve into a closed-
economy version.12 The exchange rate channel is  shut down and the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism works solely through the output gap. 
Both the current and expected change in the real exchange rate appear on the right-hand side 
of the Phillips curve (equation (1)), which can be rewritten as  
t t t t t t t t t tπ b(q q ) β(E π b(E q q )) κy u        1 1 1                
Defining  
REX
t t t tπ π b(q q )   1         (9) 
as the domestic rate of inflation purged of the real exchange rate effect allows us to rewrite the 
original open-economy Phillips curve as 
REX REX
t t t t tπ βE π κy u  1         (10) 
Written in this form, equation (10) looks like the original Phillips curve. The only difference 
between equation (1) and equation (10) pertains to the definition of the rate inflation. 
                                                          
12 Ball (1999) calls his version of real-exchange-rate-adjusted inflation in a backward-looking model “long-run 




The remaining two equations of the model can be rewritten in terms of the real-exchange-rate-
adjusted rate of inflation: 
REX f f
t t t 1 1 t t t 1 1 2 t t 1 t 3 t t t 1 ty E y a (R E π ) (a (b γ ) a )(E q q ) a ( y E y ) v             (11) 
  
      
REX f
t t t 1 t t 1 t t 1 t t
f
tR E π R E π (1 b)(E q q ) ε      (12)  
 After substitution of equation (12) into equation (11) to eliminate the nominal interest 
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         s. t. 
        
REX REX
t t t t tπ βE π κy u  1  
     and 
   
          f f f ft t t 1 1 t t t 1 t 1 2 t t 1 t 3 t t t 1 ty E y a (R E π ε ) (a (1 γ ) a )(E q q ) a ( y E y ) v
 
 
Solving the optimization problem yields the target rule under REX inflation targeting: 




Δ REXt t t
δ q
y μκπ
a ( γ ) a
1 2
0
1     (14) 
 
 It is evident that the systematic relationship between the target variables depends on demand-
side characteristics of the model economy: the denominator of the coefficient on the change in 
the real exchange rate depends on γ, a1 and a2. Together with δ these parameters determine the 
relative importance of the real exchange rate in the target rule.13,14 Combining equation (14) with 
equations (10) – (12) yields the solutions for the endogenous variables and the policy instrument.  
 
                                                          













p = the real-exchange- 
rate-adjusted price level.  
14 Broadening the mandate of the central bank thus leads to a less parsimonious target rule. With 𝛿 = 0, only two 
parameters,  𝜅 and 𝜇, appear in the target rule:  Δ
REX
t t
y μκπ 0 . Barring the definition of inflation, the target rule 
is the same as in a closed economy framework. 
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3. EVALUATION OF SIMPLE INTEREST RATE RULES 
 This section evaluates Taylor rules relative to optimal policy in flexible inflation 
targeting regimes for each of the three inflation objectives, as set out in the previous section.  
Simple Taylor rules will generate greater losses than the optimal policy for two general reasons: 
first the simple rule responds only to realized values of the target variables - not to the 
underlying shocks - and second, the coefficients, while chosen to be sensible, are arbitrary.16 We 
examine how these relative losses vary with the chosen inflation objective and with the role 
given to exchange rate stability as a policy objective and/or argument in the Taylor rule. 
Initially the targeting regime includes only the goals of inflation and output stabilization. 
No weight is put on the variability of the real exchange rate (δ=0).  A response to the real 
exchange rate may still improve the performance of Taylor rules because in the model in Section 
2 it has information content with respect to the other central bank objectives. Next, we allow for 
central bank concern with exchange rate volatility albeit with a small weight relative to the 
typical elements of the dual mandate (δ=0.1, δ=0.2).17  
To start, we evaluate the performance of Taylor’s original rule: 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝜏𝜋𝜋𝑡
𝑖 + 𝜏𝑦𝑦𝑡    (15) 
 R is the interest rate; πi is the chosen inflation measure (i = domestic, CPI or REX 
inflation); and y is the output gap. The coefficients are set at the values suggested by 
Taylor: τπ = 1.5 and τy = 0.5. 
 For each inflation objective we consider how the performance of this standard Taylor rule 
is affected by adding a response to the real exchange rate (q). The Taylor rule becomes 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝜏𝜋𝜋𝑡
𝑖 + 𝜏𝑦𝑦𝑡 + 𝜏𝑞𝑞𝑡.    (16) 
The value of τq is set at either 0.25 or 0.50. 
                                                          
16 These points have been stressed by Svensson (2003) and Woodford (2001). In Section 4 we examine Taylor rules 
with response coefficients that are chosen optimally.  
17 The lower relative weight on the real exchange rate in the central bank’s loss function accords with Smets’ 
(2014) view whereby price (and output) stability dominate financial stability as final objectives. It also explains why 
we choose a low to moderate coefficient for the real exchange rate in the Taylor rule. 
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Next, for each inflation objective we evaluate a variant of the rule where we change the 
relative weight on the inflation and output objectives. Finally, we consider the implications of 
central bank concern for real exchange rate volatility (δ > 0).  In all cases the Taylor rule is 
evaluated relative to the optimal policy under commitment from the timeless perspective. Table 1 
provides summary information about the parameter values and the distribution of the exogenous 
shocks used in the numerical calculations. 
A. Domestic Inflation 
1. The Standard Taylor Rule 
Table 2 shows results for a domestic inflation target (π). Panel A is for the standard 
Taylor rule. In the first column the rule has only the inflation and output gap variables.  In the 
second and third columns the rule includes the real exchange rate (q) with weight of 0.25 and 
0.5, respectively. The cells in the table show the variances of all three inflation objectives, the 
output gap, the real exchange rate (q) as well as the policy instrument (R).  Also shown are the 
value of the loss function (Loss) and the loss relative to the optimal policy (Relative Loss (%)).18 
The loss under optimal policy is given in the first column of Panel C of Table 2—labelled TP for 
optimal policy from a timeless perspective. Panel C also shows the variances under the optimal 
policy of the same variables shown in Panel A. 
The comparison of Panels A and C indicates that the loss under the Taylor rule exceeds 
that under the optimal policy by 75.9%.  The Taylor rule results in much higher output variance 
(0.92 compared to 0.11 under optimal policy) with only a modest advantage in the variance of 
domestic inflation (0.74 compared to 0.83). 
Columns 2 and 3 of Panel A show results for the cases where the real exchange rate is 
included in the Taylor rule with weights of 0.25 and 0.50, respectively. The performance 
deteriorates somewhat:. loss relative to the optimal policy rises to 78.1% and then 82.2% as the 
weight on the exchange rate increases first to 0.25 and then to 0.5. 
 
                                                          
18 The last four rows of the table can be ignored for the present.   
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2. The Modified Taylor Rule: a Higher Weight on the Output Gap 
Previous studies [e.g. Ball (1999)] have found that a simple interest rate rule such as 
equation (15) or (16) can be improved by increasing the relative weight on output. That this 
might be the case in our model is suggested by the fact that the main reason why the Taylor rules 
performance falls short of the optimal policy outcome is the high variance of the output gap. 
Panel B explores this possibility by increasing τy from 0.5 to 1.0. 
For equation (15), which excludes the real exchange rate, welfare loss relative to the 
optimal policy falls from 75.9% to 53.9 %.  The variance of output declines substantially with 
only a small rise in the variance of domestic inflation. In the case of equation (16) with the real 
exchange rate response included, increasing the weight on output is also welfare improving. It is 
still the case, however, that inclusion of the real exchange rate results in higher welfare loss.   
3. The Real Exchange Rate as Policy Goal 
To this point the loss function gives weights only to inflation and the output gap 
stabilization (δ=0 in equation (5)). The results in Table 2 suggest that concern for exchange rate 
volatility is important for the evaluation of the desirability of Taylor rules relative to the optimal 
policy. A comparison of the first column of Panel A with the first column of Panel C reveals that 
the variance of the real exchange rate (q) under the optimal policy exceeds that under the Taylor 
rule by 83% for the specification where there is no response to the exchange rate (equation (15)).  
The optimal policy is much more aggressive in pursuing the inflation and output goals as can be 
seen by the much higher variance of the interest rate under this policy. The result is a better 
outcome for the output goal though not for domestic inflation, but also much more volatility of 
the real exchange rate.   
The last two rows of Panels A and B of Table 2 show the welfare loss from following a 
Taylor rule relative to the optimal policy when the real exchange rate is given a weight as a 
policy goal. The weight on the real exchange rate (δ) is set at 0.1 or 0.2 times the weight on 
inflation (µ). The weights on inflation and output are then adjusted such that the weights in the 
loss function sum to 2.0 as before.20 The comparison here is now to the losses under the optimal 
                                                          
20 For all cases in this section the weights on inflation and the output gap are held equal. The method of calculating 
the scaled weights is explained in the notes accompanying Table 2. 
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policy shown in the second and third columns of Panel C of the table.  Even for these relatively 
small weights on exchange rate stability, the loss from following a Taylor rule relative to the 
optimal policy is diminished considerably. For the standard Taylor rule with no response to the 
real exchange rate, the relative loss with δ=0.2 is 42.8% compared to 75.9% percent. For the 
modified Taylor rule shown in column 1 of Panel B, the corresponding welfare loss diminishes 
from 53.9% to 28.4%. 
 Inclusion of real exchange rate volatility as a policy goal (δ > 0) also affects the 
desirability of including a response to the real exchange rate in the Taylor rule. For either weight 
attached to the output gap ( 0.5 or 1.0), it is now the case that adding the real exchange rate to the 
Taylor rule reduces the loss relative to the optimal policy. For the larger weight on the real 
exchange rate in the loss function (δ=0.2), a value of 0.50 for τq reduces this loss from 42.8% to 
29.9% for an output weight of 0.5 and from 28.4% to 20.3% for a weight of 1.0. 
 Panel D of Table 2 summarizes the way in which the losses under a Taylor rule relative 
to the optimal policy change as we vary the weight on output (τy), the weight on the real 
exchange rate (τq) and the weight on the real exchange rate in the loss function (δ). The rule with 
(τy=1.0; τq=0.50; δ=0.2) has a loss of 20.3% relative to the optimal policy. 
B. CPI Inflation 
Table 3 presents results when CPI inflation (πCPI) is the inflation objective.  
1. The Standard Taylor Rule 
Quantitatively, the losses from following a Taylor rule instead of the optimal policy are 
smaller for CPI than for domestic inflation targeting. From the first column of Panel A, it can be 
seen that for Taylor’s original rule the relative loss is 32.3% compared to 75.9% for domestic 
inflation. The primary reason for the difference is that optimal policy is less aggressive when CPI 
inflation is the target. The variance of the interest rate falls by more than 50% relative to that 
under domestic inflation targeting. The interest rate is less variable because the resulting 
volatility in the real exchange rate results in displacement of CPI inflation. Even if the variance 
of the exchange rate is given no weight in the central bank loss function, exchange rate volatility 
is costly.  Thus, for a CPI inflation target the loss under optimal policy from a timeless 
15 
 
perspective is greater and closer to the Taylor rule outcome. Output is more variable under the 
Taylor rule but the difference is less marked than for the case of domestic inflation targeting. 
A second pattern that differs for CPI relative to domestic inflation stabilization is that for 
a standard Taylor rule it is now the case that including a small response to the real exchange rate 
(τq=0.25) improves the rule’s performance; the relative loss falls from 32.3% to 28.8%. 
Increasing τq to 0.5 raises this loss to 29.9%, still below the loss for the case of no response to the 
real exchange rate.   
2. The Modified Taylor Rule: a Higher Weight on the Output Gap 
 Panel B of Table 3 shows results for the case where the weight on output stabilization 
(τy) is increased from 0.5 to 1.0. As was the case with domestic inflation stabilization, this 
change reduces the relative loss from employing the Taylor-type rule. In the case where there is 
no real exchange rate response (Panel B, column 1), choosing the higher weight on output 
reduces the loss from 32.3% to 22.3%. From columns 2 and 3 of Panel B it can be seen that 
adding a response to the exchange rate results in a small improvement for τq=0.25 but a minor 
deterioration of performance for τq= 0.5.  
3. The Real Exchange Rate as a Policy Goal 
If the central bank values real exchange rate stability (δ=0.1; δ=0.2), policy from a 
timeless perspective becomes less aggressive. Output is somewhat more variable and the real 
exchange rate is much less variable. The variance of CPI inflation is virtually unchanged. For 
comparison we begin with the standard Taylor rule (τπ=1.5; τy=0.5; τq=0). As can be seen from 
the first columns of Panels A and D, the relative loss from following the Taylor rule increases if 
the real exchange rate is given a weight in the loss function. The relative loss rises very slightly 
from 32.3% to 32.5% with a weight on the real exchange rate of 0.1 and to 37.3% for a weight of 
0.2. The optimal policy adjusts with the change but the Taylor rule is unchanged. Adding a real 
exchange rate response to the Taylor rule in this case, however, improves its relative 
performance substantially as can be seen from the second and third columns of Panels A and D 
of Table 3.  With a response coefficient (τq) of 0.50 on the exchange rate, the relative loss for the 
Taylor rule falls from 37.3% to 19.1% for δ=0.2. 
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Panel B and the right-hand portion of Panel D of Table 3 show results with a higher 
weight on output (τy=1.0) in the Taylor rule. These results parallel those for the standard Taylor 
rule. Adding the real exchange rate to the loss function with a Taylor rule that does not include a 
real exchange rate response  causes the loss relative to the optimal policy to increase (Panel B; 
column 1). When an exchange rate response is added to the Taylor rule, its relative performance 
improves substantially with losses relative to optimal policy falling as low as 14.3 %.  
C. REX Inflation 
Table 4 presents results for the strategy of REX inflation (πREX) targeting.  As pointed out 
in Section 2, REX inflation targeting restores the isomorphism between optimal policy in the 
open economy and that in a closed economy. One result following from this property is that the 
optimal policy adjusts the interest rate to perfectly offset all demand-side shocks. Another 
implication is that the trade-off between output and inflation is least favorable under this 
inflation objective; reductions in inflation require the largest sacrifice in output.  Optimal policy 
under this inflation objective thus results in a high degree of output stabilization. Moreover, there 
is an aggressive use of the interest rate instrument, resulting in a high variance of the real 
exchange rate if exchange rate stability is not a policy goal (δ=0). 
1. The Standard Taylor Rule 
With Taylor’s original rule (τπ=1.5; τy=0.5; τq=0), the welfare loss from following a 
Taylor rule relative to the optimal policy is 99.5%, higher than with the other inflation targets ( 
Panel A, Column 1)). The loss comes mostly from higher output instability. The variance of the 
output gap under the standard Taylor rule exceeds that under the optimal policy by a factor of 20.  
Adding a real exchange rate response worsens the performance of the standard Taylor rule (Panel 
A, columns 2 and 3). Loss relative to optimal policy rises to 102.2% for τq=0.5. 
2. The Modified Taylor Rule: a Higher Weight on the Output Gap 
Panel B of Table 3 reports results where a higher weight is attached to the output gap 
(τy=1.0) in the Taylor rule.  This change reduces the relative loss under the Taylor rule compared 
to the optimal policy from 99.5% to 72.8% when no response to the real exchange rate is 
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included in the rule. Including a response to the real exchange rate in this version of the Taylor 
rule again increases the relative loss. 
3.  The Real Exchange Rate as a Policy Goal  
If real exchange rate stability is a policy goal (δ = 0.1 or 0.2), optimal policy under the 
timeless perspective becomes considerably less aggressive (Panel C, columns 2 and 3). Now at 
the margin the gains in output or REX inflation stability do not justify the costs in terms of 
increased real exchange rate volatility. With δ=0.2, the variance of the real exchange rate falls 
from 5.86 to 1.91. The variance of the policy instrument falls from 5.01 to 2.02. Optimal policy 
converges toward policy under the Taylor rule.  The relative loss from following the standard 
Taylor rule falls substantially (Panel D). The fall is even more pronounced if a response to the 
real exchange rate is included in the Taylor rule. With a real exchange rate response coefficient 
of 0.5 and δ = 0.2, the relative loss for the Taylor rule is 37.3% compared to 99.5% for the 
standard Taylor rule when real exchange rate is not a policy goal (δ=0). As in previous cases 
putting a higher weight on the output gap (τy=1 instead of 0.5) in the Taylor rule improves its 
performance. With δ=0.2 in the loss function, relative loss is reduced to 26.4% if the response 
coefficient to the real exchange rate (τq) is 0.5.    
D. Comparisons Across Inflation Targeting Strategies and Loss Functions 
Table 5 presents comparisons of the relative losses that result from using a Taylor rule in 
place of the optimal policy from a timeless perspective across the three inflation targeting 
regimes. Table 6 compares the gains from adding a real exchange rate response to various 
specifications of the Taylor rule for different specifications of the loss function. 
1. Relative Losses across Inflation Targeting Regimes 
Employing the standard Taylor rule instead of optimal policy results in substantial losses 
for each of the three inflation targets if only output and inflation appear in the loss function. This 
can be seen from the first row of panel A in Table 5. This results from the fact that the Taylor 
rule responds only to realized values of the target variables, not to the underlying shocks, and 
that the weights in the Taylor rule are set arbitrarily. In the case of targeting domestic or CPI 
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inflation the optimal policy also takes advantage of the information content of the exchange 
rate.21  
The relative losses are largest for REX inflation targeting (99.5%) because in that case 
the optimal policy can, by responding to the demand-side shock directly, adjust the interest rate 
to offset its effect. The Taylor rule cannot. The relative loss under CPI inflation targeting is 
smallest (32.3%). For this inflation objective the optimal policy is least aggressive because 
adjusting the interest rate with consequent effects on the real exchange rate displaces CPI 
inflation; thus the optimal policy is closer to the standard Taylor rule for this objective. Losses 
with domestic inflation as the inflation objective fall in between (75.9%). 
  Relative losses in each case result mainly from higher output variability under the Taylor 
rule. Thus, in row 2 of Panel A the performance of the Taylor rule is improved considerably 
when the weight on the output gap (τy) in the rule is increased from 0.5 to 1.0. The gains are 
approximately 30% for each of the inflation objectives. 
Panel B of Table 5 shows the relative losses from the Taylor rule when the variance of 
the real exchange rate (q) is also a policy goal. The case in the table is δ = 0.2. The resulting 
scaled weights in the loss function (𝜇𝜋, 𝜇𝑦, 𝜇𝑞) are (0.909, 0.909, 0.182); the weight on the real 
exchange rate is relatively small. For the results in lines 1 and 3 of Panel B, the Taylor rules are 
the same as those in Panel A. The interest rate settings are the same but loss is computed with the 
new weights. Moreover the optimal policy to which the Taylor rule is compared now is 
computed using these weights. 
Relative losses from following the Taylor rules decline considerably with these 
alternative weights.  The optimal policy becomes less aggressive when penalized for resulting 
real exchange rate volatility and comes closer to the behavior of the corresponding Taylor rule.  
The relative ranking across the three inflation objectives remains the same. The range of the 
relative losses, however, is far more compact. Losses relative to optimal policy decrease to 
14.3% for CPI inflation, 20.3% for domestic inflation, and 26.4% for REX inflation if policy 
follows a modified Taylor rule that smooths the real exchange rate. 
                                                          
21 Froyen and Guender (2017) employ an open economy Phillips curve (Eq. 1) to show that the real exchange rate 
enters the target rule for both a domestic and CPI inflation objective under optimal discretionary policy.  
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2. Gains from Adding an Exchange Rate Response to the Taylor Rule 
Rows 2 and 4 of Panel B in Table 5 show the losses for the Taylor rule relative to optimal 
policy when a real exchange rate response is added to the rule (τq = 0.5) and the variance of the 
real exchange rate given a weight in the loss function (δ = 0.2). In Table 6 these losses are 
compared to the losses of the corresponding Taylor rules without the real exchange rate response 
(Panel B). Table 6 also shows the gain or loss from adding a real exchange rate response to the 
Taylor rules if the loss function gives a weight only to inflation and the output gap (Panel A).   
 In Table 6, if we confine ourselves to Panel A (δ=0), the results are consistent with 
Taylor’s (2001, p.266) description of previous studies: “they seem to be suggesting similar 
conclusions  either that there are small performance improvements from reacting to the exchange 
rate or that such reactions can make performance worse.” Only for CPI inflation targeting with 
the standard rule and Taylor’s original weights is the gain (10.8%) not clearly “small.” In the 
cases of domestic and REX inflation targeting, performance of the Taylor rule deteriorates 
relative to the optimal policy when a real exchange rate response is added. 
The situation is different when the real exchange rate variance is given a weight in the 
loss function.  For each of the three inflation targets the gain is greatest for the higher real 
exchange rate response (τq= 0.5).  Across the three targeting strategies, the gains are highest for 
CPI inflation targeting: 48.8% for the rule with Taylor’s weights and 46.6% with the higher 
weight on the output gap (τy =1). Gains for the other two inflation targets are between 28% and 
30%. If an even smaller weight is chosen for real exchange rate variance (δ = 0.1) such that the 
scaled weight (0.09524) comprises less than 5% of the sum total (2) of the weights in the loss 
function, adding an exchange rate response to the Taylor rule still appears desirable. For the rule 
with Taylor’s original weights, the gains are 33.5% for CPI inflation, 13.9% for REX inflation 
and 11.5% for domestic inflation. 
 What drives the results in Tables 5 and 6? With only inflation and the output gap as 
policy goals, optimal policy from a timeless perspective is very aggressive, resulting in high real 
exchange rate volatility.  The Taylor rule is less aggressive. When the variance of the real 
exchange rate is also a policy goal, optimal policy takes volatility of the real exchange rate into 
20 
 
account and becomes less aggressive. Relative losses from using the Taylor rule are generally 
lower. Moreover in this case a Taylor rule that smooths the exchange rate is preferred. 
4. RESULTS WITH OPTIMIZED TAYLOR-TYPE RULES 
  Taylor chose coefficients he believed were sensible but which were not tied to a specific 
model. Other papers have constructed Taylor-type rules with coefficients chosen to be optimal 
within a model. Examples within an open economy context are: Garcia, Restrepo and Roger 
(2011), Leitemo and Söderström (2005), and Batini, Harrison and Millard (2001)  
 Previous studies have found that, when unconstrained, the optimal response coefficients 
in Taylor rules have been too high to be economically sensible.  These studies have addressed 
the problem by including the change in the interest rate as a cost in the policymaker’s loss 
function. There are valid reasons that justify interest rate stability as a policy objective.22  We 
follow this course. The resulting objective function for the central bank is given below Table 7. 
The real exchange rate only appears for δ > 0. The weight on the interest rate stability argument 
(𝜑) is set at 0.1. The Taylor rules are unchanged from those in the previous section (equations 
(15) and (16)). The parameters are now chosen by joint optimization to minimize the new 
objective function. Because the objective function has changed the losses are not strictly 
comparable with those in Section 3.  
A. Losses from Optimized Taylor Rules 
Panel A of Table 7 shows the parameter values of the optimized Taylor rules without the 
real exchange rate for each of the three inflation targets. The loss score and relative loss, 
measured by losses above that of optimal policy from a timeless perspective are also shown. 
 The first row of the table provides results with δ = 0; the real exchange rate is given no 
weight in the loss function. The optimized Taylor rules show a stronger response to the output 
gap than Taylor’s original rule (τy=0.5) or the adjusted value (τy=1.0) used in the previous 
section for each of the three inflation targets. The response to inflation is smaller than Taylor’s 
                                                          
22 On the issues relevant to interest smoothing as a policy goal of an optimizing central bank see Rudebusch (2002) 
and Söderström et al. (2005). 
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value (τπ=1.5) for the domestic inflation or REX inflation target but higher for the CPI inflation 
target.   
The pattern of losses relative to the optimal policy is the same as for the Taylor rules in 
the previous section. Losses for CPI inflation are smallest; those for REX inflation are largest 
with those for domestic inflation in between but closer to those for REX inflation. All losses 
relative to the optimal policy are smaller in Table 7A than those for the comparable rules in the 
previous section. But as  noted the losses are not strictly comparable. 
The second and third lines of panel A provide results where the central bank objective 
function includes stability of the real exchange rate. In the case of optimized Taylor rules, 
coefficients tend to decline as exchange rate volatility is given a larger weight.  Optimal policy 
from a timeless perspective also becomes less aggressive with exchange rate volatility as an 
added policy goal. In the table the relative losses from using a Taylor rule are lower for the 
domestic and REX inflation target but higher for the CPI inflation target.  
B. Optimized Taylor Rules with a Real Exchange Rate Response 
Panel B of Table 7 shows results for optimized Taylor rules when the real exchange rate 
is added to the rule. The first row of the panel contains results for the case where the rule 
includes a response to the real exchange rate but the loss function does not give a weight to real 
exchange rate stability (δ = 0). It is for this case that Taylor (2001) summarized the evidence as 
pointing to at best a small performance gain when a real exchange rate response is added to the 
rule. The table indicates no gain when domestic inflation is the target, a gain of 3.3% with the 
REX inflation target and 13.7% with a CPI inflation target.23  Only the last case might suggest 
need for a revision in Taylor’s summary of the evidence. 
The situation is different when exchange rate stability is a policy goal even with a small 
weight (δ=0.1, δ=0.2). Results for these cases are shown in the second and third rows of Table 
7B. The inclusion of exchange rate stability as a goal results in an increase in the optimal real 
exchange rate response in the Taylor rule. In a few cases the response to the real exchange rate 
exceeds the response to the inflation target. The gains to adding a real exchange rate response to 
                                                          
23 The gains are calculated in the same way as those reported in Table 6. 
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the rule, measured by the reduction in loss relative to the timeless perspective, are substantial for 
each inflation targeting strategy.  With the higher weight on exchange rate stability (δ = 0.2) the 
gains are 41.4% for domestic inflation targeting, 58.9% for CPI inflation targeting, and 50.2% 
for REX inflation targeting. Even with the smaller weight (δ=0.1), the performance of Taylor 
rules improves markedly with the addition of a response to the real exchange rate. 
5. CONCLUSION 
In our final exercise assessing the losses from using Taylor rules in place of optimal 
policy from a timeless perspective (the bottom line of Table 7B), the relative losses are small, 
approximately 10% for each of the inflation targeting strategies. This is for a rule with optimized 
responses to the target variables including the real exchange rate and for the case where 
exchange rate stabilization is a secondary policy goal next to inflation and output gap stability. 
These losses are substantially lower than in the first case we considered in Section 3. There, the 
rule used Taylor’s original coefficients; there was no exchange rate response; and exchange rate 
stabilization was not a policy goal. The relative losses to employing the Taylor rule were 75.9% 
for domestic inflation targeting, 32.3% for CPI targeting, and 99.5% for REX inflation targeting. 
Three factors are of importance in the improvement in the relative performance of the Taylor 
rule. 
First, if real exchange rate stability is a minor goal, relative loss to a standard Taylor rule 
is reduced substantially for domestic and REX inflation targeting. The relative advantage of 
optimal policy for these strategies is that it is more aggressive, especially in stabilizing the output 
gap. But this advantage is achieved at the cost of increased real exchange rate volatility. If real 
exchange rate stability is a policy goal, this advantage is reduced. For CPI inflation targeting, 
exchange rate volatility affects the relevant inflation measure and is taken into account even 
without a real exchange rate goal in the loss function. Adding this goal does not reduce the 
relative loss from a standard Taylor rule under this strategy. The relative losses are therefore 
compressed across the three strategies. 
Second, even if real exchange rate stability is merely a secondary policy goal, then 
adding a real exchange rate response to the Taylor-type rule substantially improves the rule’s 
performance relative to the optimal policy for each of the three inflation targeting strategies.  
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Third, within the model set out here, Taylor’s original coefficients are far from optimal. 
A simple adjustment of the output response (from τy=0.5 to 1.0) improved the performance of the 
rule irrespective of the definition of the inflation target. If real exchange rate stability is a policy 
goal, then adding a response to the real exchange rate in the Taylor rule improves its 
performance for all three inflation objectives.  Finally, we have seen that using values of the 
coefficients in the Taylor rule chosen optimally for each inflation targeting strategy and 
including a real exchange rate response further reduces and compresses the welfare loss relative 
to optimal policy from the timeless perspective. 
If one believes that employing coefficients that are chosen to be optimal within a specific 
model violates the spirit of the Taylor rule, the relevant losses from employing Taylor rules are 
those in Section 3. There, when openness is taken into account with a minor weight given to 
stabilizing the real exchange rate and an exchange rate response included in the rule, the losses 
are: 20.3% for domestic inflation targeting; 14.3% for CPI inflation targeting; and 26.4% for 
REX inflation targeting.24    
Taylor and Williams (2011, p.829-30) echo Taylor’s (2001) pessimistic conclusion on 
the merits of including an exchange rate response in simple interest rate rules. The literature on 
open economies that they had to survey in this regard, however, dated from the 1990s, focused 
on large economies and concentrated on the traditional elements of the dual mandate.25  Our 
results are based on a later generation of New Keynesian models in which the real exchange rate 
has a more fundamental role. This is important. Still, most crucial for the merits of including an 
exchange rate in the Taylor rules we consider is whether the central bank places a weight on 
stability of the real exchange rate. It is noteworthy that even with a small weight on real 
exchange rate stability, inclusion of the real exchange rate results in significant improvement in 
the rule’s performance relative to optimal policy under the timeless perspective. If the dual 
mandate is expanded to include real exchange rate stability even as a lesser policy goal, as seems 
                                                          
24 The losses are measured for τy=1 instead of τy=0.5 in Taylor’s original rule, an adjustment made in a number of 
previous studies. 
25 See Bryant et al. (1993) and Henderson and McKibbin (1993).  Several more recent studies, which we cite in the 
introduction, also support their pessimistic conclusion. 
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sensible given the current turbulence in world financial markets,  pessimism concerning the 
usefulness of including a real exchange rate response in Taylor-type rules is unwarranted.  
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Table 1: Calibration of Model 
The following values for the parameters and variances of the stochastic disturbances are used in 
the numerical calculations of the variances of the endogenous variables of the model. Some of 







𝑎1 = (1 − 𝛾)𝜎 0.45 








2= 1 for 𝑗 = 𝑣, 𝑢, 𝑦𝑓 , 𝑅𝑓 , 𝜖, 𝜋𝑓 
 
  
𝛾 = degree of consumption openness 
𝜎 = intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption 
𝜂 = elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign consumption good 
𝜂𝑓 = foreign elasticity of substitution between foreign and domestic consumption good  
𝛾𝑓 = degree of consumption openness abroad 






Table 2: Domestic Inflation Target 
A. Std. TR Std.TR+.25q Std.TR+.5q B. TR(𝜏𝑦 = 1) TR(𝜏𝑦 = 1)+.25q TR(𝜏𝑦 = 1)+.5q 
V(y) 0.9218 0.9103 0.9243 V(y) 0.6704 0.6940 0.7286 
𝑉(𝜋𝑅𝐸𝑋) 0.8939 0.9129 0.9266 𝑉(𝜋𝑅𝐸𝑋) 0.9108 0.9244 0.9348 
𝑉(𝜋) 0.7442 0.7763 0.8016 𝑉(𝜋) 0.7870 0.8083 0.8262 
𝑉(𝜋𝐶𝑃𝐼) 0.9024 0.8082 0.7637 𝑉(𝜋𝐶𝑃𝐼) 1.0167 0.9190 0.8632 
V(R) 1.2693 1.0411 0.9407 V(R) 1.2612 1.0573 0.9541 
V(q) 2.8179 2.0138 1.5180 V(q) 2.7400 2.0673 1.6194 
Loss 1.6660 1.6866 1.7259 Loss 1.4574 1.5022 1.5548 
Relative Loss (%) 75.9 78.1 82.2 Relative Loss (%) 53.9 58.6 64.1 
Loss(q,δ=.09524) 1.8851 1.7981 1.7883 Loss(q,δ=.09524) 1.6490 1.6277 1.6350 
Relative Loss 
 (q, δ=.09524) (%) 46.2 41.7 40.9 
Relative Loss 
 (q, δ=.09524) (%) 30.0 28.3 28.9 
Loss(q,δ=.1818) 2.0267 1.8992 1.8448 Loss(q,δ=.1818) 1.8229 1.7414 1.7077 
Relative Loss 
 (q, δ=.1818) (%) 42.8 33.8 29.9 
Relative Loss 
 (q, δ=.1818) (%) 28.4 22.7 20.3 
Loss = 𝑉(𝑦𝑡) + 𝜇𝑉(𝜋𝑡)  For all cases considered µ = 1.  Loss (q,δ) = 𝜇
𝑦𝑉(𝑦𝑡) + 𝜇
𝜋𝑉(𝜋𝑡) + 𝛿𝑉(𝑞𝑡). For 𝛿 = .1𝜇
𝜋 and 𝜇𝑦=𝜇𝜋 the loss function becomes: 
       Loss (q,δ) = 𝜇𝜋𝑉(𝑦𝑡) + 𝜇
𝜋𝑉(𝜋𝑡) + .1𝜇
𝜋𝑉(𝑞𝑡). The sum of the weights must add up to 2.  
Hence 2.1𝜇𝜋 = 2 or 𝜇𝜋 = .9524. From this it follows that 𝛿 = .09524 = 𝜇𝑞 . Follow the same 
procedure for the case of 𝛿 = .2𝜇𝜋. 
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C. TP TP(q,δ=.09524) TP(q,δ=.1818) 
V(y) 0.1146 0.2104 0.3486 
𝑉(𝜋𝑅𝐸𝑋) 0.8392 0.8670 0.8858 
𝑉(𝜋) 0.8327 0.8343 0.8465 
𝑉(𝜋𝐶𝑃𝐼) 1.9618 1.3781 1.1378 
V(R) 4.0318 2.5010 1.9121 
V(q) 5.1574 2.8755 1.8334 
Loss 0.9472 1.2688 1.4197 
D. 𝜏𝜋 = 1.5, 𝜏𝑦 = .5 𝜏𝜋 = 1.5, 𝜏𝑦 = 1 
δ /𝜏𝑞 0 .25 .5 0 .25 .5 
0 75.9 78.1 83.2 53.9 58.6 64.1 
.1 46.2 41.7 40.9 30.0 28.3 28.9 




Table 3: CPI Inflation Target  
A. Std. TR Std.TR+.25q Std.TR+.5q B. TR(𝜏𝑦 = 1) TR(𝜏𝑦 = 1)+.25q TR(𝜏𝑦 = 1)+.5q 
V(y) 0.9945 0.9613 0.9686 V(y) 0.7432 0.7573 0.7865 
𝑉(𝜋𝑅𝐸𝑋) 0.8675 0.8978 0.9169 𝑉(𝜋𝑅𝐸𝑋) 0.8961 0.9150 0.9283 
𝑉(𝜋) 0.7213 0.7672 0.7988 𝑉(𝜋) 0.7737 0.8023 0.8241 
𝑉(𝜋𝐶𝑃𝐼) 0.6759 0.6660 0.6714 𝑉(𝜋𝐶𝑃𝐼) 0.8019 0.7734 0.7616 
V(R) 1.0510 0.9992 0.9874 V(R) 1.0019 0.9666 0.9531 
V(q) 2.5792 1.7463 1.2894 V(q) 2.3746 1.7555 1.3655 
Loss 1.6704 1.6272 1.6399 Loss 1.5451 1.5307 1.5482 
Relative Loss (%) 32.3 28.8 29.9 Relative Loss (%) 22.3 21.2 22.6 
Loss(q,δ=.09524) 1.8365 1.7162 1.6847 Loss(q,δ=.09524) 1.6977 1.6250 1.6045 
Relative Loss 
 (q, δ=.09524) (%) 32.5 23.8 21.6 
Relative Loss 
 (q, δ=.09524) (%) 22.5 17.3 15.8 
Loss(q,δ=.1818) 1.9875 1.7969 1.7253 Loss(q,δ=.1818) 1.8364 1.7107 1.6556 
Relative Loss 
 (q, δ=.1818) (%) 37.3 24.1 19.1 
Relative Loss 
 (q, δ=.1818) (%) 26.8 18.1 14.3 
Loss = 𝑉(𝑦𝑡) + 𝜇𝑉(𝜋𝑡
𝐶𝑃𝐼)  For all cases considered µ = 1.  Loss (q,δ) = 𝑉(𝑦𝑡) + 𝜇𝑉(𝜋𝑡
𝐶𝑃𝐼) + 𝛿𝑉(𝑞𝑡) See Table 2 for calculation of scaled weights. 
 
Definitions:           
Std. TR=𝑅𝑡 = 1.5𝜋𝑡
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D. 𝜏𝜋 = 1.5, 𝜏𝑦 = .5 𝜏𝜋 = 1.5, 𝜏𝑦 = 1 
δ /𝜏𝑞 0 .25 .5 0 .25 .5 
0 32.3 28.8 29.9 22.3 21.2 22.6 
.1 32.5 23.8 21.6 22.5 17.3 15.8 
.2 37.3 24.1 19.1 26.8 18.1 14.3 
C. TP TP(q,δ=.09524) TP(q,δ=.1818) 
V(y) 0.6363 0.6752 0.7279 
𝑉(𝜋𝑅𝐸𝑋) 0.8035 0.8335 0.8550 
𝑉(𝜋) 0.6690 0.7137 0.7472 
𝑉(𝜋𝐶𝑃𝐼) 0.6267 0.6198 0.6283 
V(R) 1.7628 1.6749 1.6262 
V(q) 2.3134 1.6017 1.1834 




Table 4:  REX Inflation Target 
 
Loss = 𝑉(𝑦𝑡) + 𝜇𝑉(𝜋𝑡
𝑅𝐸𝑋) For all cases considered µ = 1. Loss (q,δ) = 𝑉(𝑦𝑡) + 𝜇𝑉(𝜋𝑡





Definitions: Std.TR=𝑅𝑡 = 1.5𝜋𝑡
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A. Std. TR Std.TR+.25q Std.TR+.5q B. TR(𝜏𝑦 = 1) TR(𝜏𝑦 = 1)+.25q TR(𝜏𝑦 = 1)+.5q 
V(y) 0.9193 0.9053 0.9167 V(y) 0.6623 0.6826 0.7154 
𝑉(𝜋𝑅𝐸𝑋) 0.9023 0.9181 0.9300 𝑉(𝜋𝑅𝐸𝑋) 0.9159 0.9278 0.9372 
𝑉(𝜋) 0.7558 0.7821 0.8043 𝑉(𝜋) 0.7951 0.8127 0.8285 
𝑉(𝜋𝐶𝑃𝐼) 1.0243 0.8872 0.8162 𝑉(𝜋𝐶𝑃𝐼) 1.1307 0.9969 0.9177 
V(R) 1.5963 1.2046 1.0161 V(R) 1.5610 1.2219 1.0405 
V(q) 2.9496 2.1377 1.6202 V(q) 2.9091 2.2065 1.7308 
Loss 1.8216 1.8233 1.8467 Loss 1.5782 1.6104 1.6526 
Relative Loss (%) 99.5 99.7 102.2 Relative Loss (%) 72.8 76.4 81.0 
Loss(q,δ=.09524) 2.0158 1.9402 1.9131 Loss(q,δ=.09524) 1.7801 1.7439 1.7388 
Relative Loss  
(q, δ=.09524) (%) 58.2 52.2 50.1 
Relative Loss  
(q, δ=.09524) (%) 39.7 36.8 36.4 
Loss(q,δ=.1818) 2.1921 2.0461 1.9732 Loss(q,δ=.1818) 1.9635 1.8650 1.8169 
Relative Loss (q, 
δ=.1818) (%) 52.5 42.4 37.3 
Relative Loss (q, 
δ=.1818) (%) 36.6 29.8 26.4 
C. TP TP(q, 𝛿 = .09524) TP(q, 𝛿 = .1818) 
V(y) 0.0456 0.1408 0.2962 
𝑉(𝜋𝑅𝐸𝑋) 0.8675 0.8886 0.9035 
𝑉(𝜋) 0.9473 0.9114 0.9058 
𝑉(𝜋𝐶𝑃𝐼) 2.5544 1.6954 1.3517 
V(R) 5.0124 2.7977 2.0169 
V(q) 5.8572 3.0888 1.9070 
Loss 0.9131 1.2746 1.4371 
D. 𝜏𝜋 = 1.5, 𝜏𝑦 = .5 𝜏𝜋 = 1.5, 𝜏𝑦 = 1 
δ /𝜏𝑞 0 .25 .5 0 .25 .5 
0 99.5 99.7 102.2 72.8 76.4 81.0 
.1 58.2 52.2 50.1 39.7 36.8 36.4 




Table 5: Comparisons Across Inflation Targeting Strategiesa 
   
A. Loss Function with Inflation and Output Gap 
Relative Loss %  Domestic  CPI  REX 
1. Standard TR  75.9   32.3  99.5 
2. Standard TR (τy=1)  53.9   22.3  72.8 
 
B. Loss Function Including Real Exchange Rate (δ=0.2) 
 
Relative Loss %  
1. Standard TR  42.8   37.3  52.5 
2. TR with τq=0.5  29.9   19.1  37.3 
3. Standard TR (τy=1)  28.4   26.8  36.6 
4. TR (τy=1) with τq=0.5 20.3   14.3  26.4  
 
a. Entries in the table show the percentage by which the value of the loss function for policy by the 
Taylor rule exceeds that for the optimal policy from a timeless perspective.   






Table 6: Gain (+) or Loss (-) from Adding a Real Exchange Rate Response to the Taylor Rule  
     (Percent)a 
 
       Domestic CPI  REX 
A. 
Loss Funct. with only    Taylor’s Weights -2.9  10.8  -0.2  
inflation & output gap   τy=1   -8.7  4.9  -5.2 
 
B.     
Loss Funct. with inflation,     Taylor’s Weights 30.1  48.8  29.0 
output gap, and r. exch. rate  τy=1   28.5  46.6  27.9 
(δ=0.2)       
 
a Gain or loss is measured as the change in the loss relative to the optimal policy under the timeless 
perspective. The real exchange rate response (τq) is set at 0.25 or 0.5 depending on which minimizes 
relative loss. For example, for CPI inflation with the loss function containing only πCPI and y, in Table 3 
we have: Relative Loss (τq=0) = 32.3% and Relative Loss (τq=0.25) = 28.8%. Thus the gain reported in 
the table is (32.3-28.8)/32.3 = 10.8%. 




Table 7: Optimized Taylor Type Rules 






B. Taylor Rule with the Real Exchange Rate 
 






2 ) where 𝜋 is domestic, CPI, or REX inflation. 𝜇 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜑 is fixed at 1 and 0.1, 
respectively. The calculation of losses is based on the unconditional variances of the variables that appear in the objective function. Percentage loss is 
measured relative to optimal policy from a timeless perspective.  
2. Numbers in bold represent cases where it was not possible to optimize freely over the policy parameters in the Taylor rule. Doing so violated the rank 
condition. Satisfying this condition ensures the existence of a determinate rational expectations equilibrium. To meet this condition, we instead 
performed a search over values of 𝜏𝜋 to find the value which minimizes (along with the optimized coefficients on  𝜏𝑦 and 𝜏𝑞) the objective function. 
This procedure had to be followed in case of a REX inflation target irrespective of the inclusion of the real exchange rate in the Taylor rule and in the 
case of a domestic inflation target when the central bank cares about real exchange rate fluctuations but does not respond to the real exchange rate 
in the Taylor rule. A superscripted asterisk denotes a freely optimized coefficient. 








∗  Loss Rel.Loss 
(%) 
𝜏𝜋 𝜏𝑦
∗  Loss Rel.Loss 
(%) 
0 0.924 2.428 1.49 23.1 3.160 3.098 1.66 15.3 0.86 2.723 1.55 28.1 
0.1 0.82 1.816 1.76 15.8 2.156 2.116 1.92 17.8 0.86 2.030 1.84 19.5 
0.2 0.85 1.525 2.01 16.9 1.620 1.607 2.17 21.9 0.86 1.641 2.11 21.3 













∗  Loss Rel.Loss 
(%) 
0 0.928 2.442 0.006 1.49 23.1 3.898 3.970 0.619 1.63 13.2 0.86 3.221 0.258 1.54 27.3 
0.1 0.818 2.413 0.496 1.72 13.2 3.340 3.534 1.350 1.81 11.0 0.86 3.221 0.861 1.76 14.3 
0.2 0.819 2.606 1.074 1.89 9.9 3.017 3.290 1.974 1.94 9.0 0.86 3.219 1.46 1.92 10.3 
